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authorMar0xy <marie@kaifa.ch>2023-09-25 01:20:03 +0200
committerMar0xy <marie@kaifa.ch>2023-09-25 01:20:03 +0200
commit89eea5df5286a9fdf2976d41cdbaf0c40dd19b62 (patch)
tree74081b1197c62768b7a012388e3c7eeb49ef30c6 /packages/backend/src/server/oauth
parentfix: upload media on masto api (diff)
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test: check old megalodon version
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/backend/src/server/oauth')
-rw-r--r--packages/backend/src/server/oauth/oauth2.txt489
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+/*
+ * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: syuilo and other misskey contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
+ */
+
+import dns from 'node:dns/promises';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { JSDOM } from 'jsdom';
+import httpLinkHeader from 'http-link-header';
+import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
+import oauth2orize, { type OAuth2, AuthorizationError, ValidateFunctionArity2, OAuth2Req, MiddlewareRequest } from 'oauth2orize';
+import oauth2Pkce from 'oauth2orize-pkce';
+import fastifyView from '@fastify/view';
+import pug from 'pug';
+import bodyParser from 'body-parser';
+import fastifyExpress from '@fastify/express';
+import { verifyChallenge } from 'pkce-challenge';
+import { mf2 } from 'microformats-parser';
+import { secureRndstr } from '@/misc/secure-rndstr.js';
+import { HttpRequestService } from '@/core/HttpRequestService.js';
+import { kinds } from '@/misc/api-permissions.js';
+import type { Config } from '@/config.js';
+import { DI } from '@/di-symbols.js';
+import { bindThis } from '@/decorators.js';
+import type { AccessTokensRepository, UsersRepository } from '@/models/_.js';
+import { IdService } from '@/core/IdService.js';
+import { CacheService } from '@/core/CacheService.js';
+import type { MiLocalUser } from '@/models/User.js';
+import { MemoryKVCache } from '@/misc/cache.js';
+import { LoggerService } from '@/core/LoggerService.js';
+import Logger from '@/logger.js';
+import { StatusError } from '@/misc/status-error.js';
+import type { ServerResponse } from 'node:http';
+import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
+const base64regex = /^([0-9a-zA-Z+/]{4})*(([0-9a-zA-Z+/]{2}==)|([0-9a-zA-Z+/]{3}=))?$/;
+
+// TODO: Consider migrating to @node-oauth/oauth2-server once
+// https://github.com/node-oauth/node-oauth2-server/issues/180 is figured out.
+// Upstream the various validations and RFC9207 implementation in that case.
+
+// Follows https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#client-identifier
+// This is also mostly similar to https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/web-server#uri-validation
+// although Google has stricter rule.
+function validateClientId(raw: string): URL {
+ // "Clients are identified by a [URL]."
+ const url = ((): URL => {
+ try {
+ if (base64regex.test(raw)) return new URL(atob(raw));
+ return new URL(raw);
+ } catch { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be a valid URL', 'invalid_request'); }
+ })();
+
+ // "Client identifier URLs MUST have either an https or http scheme"
+ // But then again:
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-3.1.2.1
+ // 'The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described
+ // in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token"'
+ const allowedProtocols = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' ? ['http:', 'https:'] : ['https:'];
+ if (!allowedProtocols.includes(url.protocol)) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be a valid HTTPS URL', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ // "MUST contain a path component (new URL() implicitly adds one)"
+
+ // "MUST NOT contain single-dot or double-dot path segments,"
+ const segments = url.pathname.split('/');
+ if (segments.includes('.') || segments.includes('..')) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain dot path segments', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ // ("MAY contain a query string component")
+
+ // "MUST NOT contain a fragment component"
+ if (url.hash) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain a fragment component', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ // "MUST NOT contain a username or password component"
+ if (url.username || url.password) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain a username or a password', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ // ("MAY contain a port")
+
+ // "host names MUST be domain names or a loopback interface and MUST NOT be
+ // IPv4 or IPv6 addresses except for IPv4 127.0.0.1 or IPv6 [::1]."
+ if (!url.hostname.match(/\.\w+$/) && !['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]'].includes(url.hostname)) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must have a domain name as a host name', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ return url;
+}
+
+interface ClientInformation {
+ id: string;
+ redirectUris: string[];
+ name: string;
+}
+
+// https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#client-information-discovery
+// "Authorization servers SHOULD support parsing the [h-app] Microformat from the client_id,
+// and if there is an [h-app] with a url property matching the client_id URL,
+// then it should use the name and icon and display them on the authorization prompt."
+// (But we don't display any icon for now)
+// https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#redirect-url
+// "The client SHOULD publish one or more <link> tags or Link HTTP headers with a rel attribute
+// of redirect_uri at the client_id URL.
+// Authorization endpoints verifying that a redirect_uri is allowed for use by a client MUST
+// look for an exact match of the given redirect_uri in the request against the list of
+// redirect_uris discovered after resolving any relative URLs."
+async function discoverClientInformation(logger: Logger, httpRequestService: HttpRequestService, id: string): Promise<ClientInformation> {
+ try {
+ const res = await httpRequestService.send(id);
+ const redirectUris: string[] = [];
+
+ const linkHeader = res.headers.get('link');
+ if (linkHeader) {
+ redirectUris.push(...httpLinkHeader.parse(linkHeader).get('rel', 'redirect_uri').map(r => r.uri));
+ }
+
+ const text = await res.text();
+ const fragment = JSDOM.fragment(text);
+
+ redirectUris.push(...[...fragment.querySelectorAll<HTMLLinkElement>('link[rel=redirect_uri][href]')].map(el => el.href));
+
+ let name = id;
+ if (text) {
+ const microformats = mf2(text, { baseUrl: res.url });
+ const nameProperty = microformats.items.find(item => item.type?.includes('h-app') && item.properties.url.includes(id))?.properties.name[0];
+ if (typeof nameProperty === 'string') {
+ name = nameProperty;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return {
+ id,
+ redirectUris: redirectUris.map(uri => new URL(uri, res.url).toString()),
+ name: typeof name === 'string' ? name : id,
+ };
+ } catch (err) {
+ console.error(err);
+ logger.error('Error while fetching client information', { err });
+ if (err instanceof StatusError) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('Failed to fetch client information', 'invalid_request');
+ } else {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('Failed to parse client information', 'server_error');
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+type OmitFirstElement<T extends unknown[]> = T extends [unknown, ...(infer R)]
+ ? R
+ : [];
+
+interface OAuthParsedRequest extends OAuth2Req {
+ codeChallenge: string;
+ codeChallengeMethod: string;
+}
+
+interface OAuthHttpResponse extends ServerResponse {
+ redirect(location: string): void;
+}
+
+interface OAuth2DecisionRequest extends MiddlewareRequest {
+ body: {
+ transaction_id: string;
+ cancel: boolean;
+ login_token: string;
+ }
+}
+
+function getQueryMode(issuerUrl: string): oauth2orize.grant.Options['modes'] {
+ return {
+ query: (txn, res, params): void => {
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9207#name-response-parameter-iss
+ // "In authorization responses to the client, including error responses,
+ // an authorization server supporting this specification MUST indicate its
+ // identity by including the iss parameter in the response."
+ params.iss = issuerUrl;
+
+ const parsed = new URL(txn.redirectURI);
+ for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
+ parsed.searchParams.append(key, value as string);
+ }
+
+ return (res as OAuthHttpResponse).redirect(parsed.toString());
+ },
+ };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Maps the transaction ID and the oauth/authorize parameters.
+ *
+ * Flow:
+ * 1. oauth/authorize endpoint will call store() to store the parameters
+ * and puts the generated transaction ID to the dialog page
+ * 2. oauth/decision will call load() to retrieve the parameters and then remove()
+ */
+class OAuth2Store {
+ #cache = new MemoryKVCache<OAuth2>(1000 * 60 * 5); // expires after 5min
+
+ load(req: OAuth2DecisionRequest, cb: (err: Error | null, txn?: OAuth2) => void): void {
+ const { transaction_id } = req.body;
+ if (!transaction_id) {
+ cb(new AuthorizationError('Missing transaction ID', 'invalid_request'));
+ return;
+ }
+ const loaded = this.#cache.get(transaction_id);
+ if (!loaded) {
+ cb(new AuthorizationError('Invalid or expired transaction ID', 'access_denied'));
+ return;
+ }
+ cb(null, loaded);
+ }
+
+ store(req: OAuth2DecisionRequest, oauth2: OAuth2, cb: (err: Error | null, transactionID?: string) => void): void {
+ const transactionId = secureRndstr(128);
+ this.#cache.set(transactionId, oauth2);
+ cb(null, transactionId);
+ }
+
+ remove(req: OAuth2DecisionRequest, tid: string, cb: () => void): void {
+ this.#cache.delete(tid);
+ cb();
+ }
+}
+
+@Injectable()
+export class OAuth2ProviderService {
+ #server = oauth2orize.createServer({
+ store: new OAuth2Store(),
+ });
+ #logger: Logger;
+
+ constructor(
+ @Inject(DI.config)
+ private config: Config,
+ private httpRequestService: HttpRequestService,
+ @Inject(DI.accessTokensRepository)
+ accessTokensRepository: AccessTokensRepository,
+ idService: IdService,
+ @Inject(DI.usersRepository)
+ private usersRepository: UsersRepository,
+ private cacheService: CacheService,
+ loggerService: LoggerService,
+ ) {
+ this.#logger = loggerService.getLogger('oauth');
+
+ const grantCodeCache = new MemoryKVCache<{
+ clientId: string,
+ userId: string,
+ redirectUri: string,
+ codeChallenge: string,
+ scopes: string[],
+
+ // fields to prevent multiple code use
+ grantedToken?: string,
+ revoked?: boolean,
+ used?: boolean,
+ }>(1000 * 60 * 5); // expires after 5m
+
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics
+ // "Authorization servers MUST support PKCE [RFC7636]."
+ this.#server.grant(oauth2Pkce.extensions());
+ this.#server.grant(oauth2orize.grant.code({
+ modes: getQueryMode(config.url),
+ }, (client, redirectUri, token, ares, areq, locals, done) => {
+ (async (): Promise<OmitFirstElement<Parameters<typeof done>>> => {
+ this.#logger.info(`Checking the user before sending authorization code to ${client.id}`);
+
+ if (!token) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('No user', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+ const user = await this.cacheService.localUserByNativeTokenCache.fetch(token,
+ () => this.usersRepository.findOneBy({ token }) as Promise<MiLocalUser | null>);
+ if (!user) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('No such user', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+
+ this.#logger.info(`Sending authorization code on behalf of user ${user.id} to ${client.id} through ${redirectUri}, with scope: [${areq.scope}]`);
+
+ const code = secureRndstr(128);
+ grantCodeCache.set(code, {
+ clientId: client.id,
+ userId: user.id,
+ redirectUri,
+ codeChallenge: (areq as OAuthParsedRequest).codeChallenge,
+ scopes: areq.scope,
+ });
+ return [code];
+ })().then(args => done(null, ...args), err => done(err));
+ }));
+ this.#server.exchange(oauth2orize.exchange.authorizationCode((client, code, redirectUri, body, authInfo, done) => {
+ (async (): Promise<OmitFirstElement<Parameters<typeof done>> | undefined> => {
+ this.#logger.info('Checking the received authorization code for the exchange');
+ const granted = grantCodeCache.get(code);
+ if (!granted) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-4.1.2
+ // "If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server
+ // MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens
+ // previously issued based on that authorization code."
+ if (granted.used) {
+ this.#logger.info(`Detected multiple code use from ${granted.clientId} for user ${granted.userId}. Revoking the code.`);
+ grantCodeCache.delete(code);
+ granted.revoked = true;
+ if (granted.grantedToken) {
+ await accessTokensRepository.delete({ token: granted.grantedToken });
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ granted.used = true;
+
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-4.1.3
+ if (body.client_id !== granted.clientId) return;
+ if (redirectUri !== granted.redirectUri) return;
+
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636.html#section-4.6
+ if (!body.code_verifier) return;
+ if (!(await verifyChallenge(body.code_verifier as string, granted.codeChallenge))) return;
+
+ const accessToken = secureRndstr(128);
+ const now = new Date();
+
+ // NOTE: we don't have a setup for automatic token expiration
+ await accessTokensRepository.insert({
+ id: idService.genId(),
+ createdAt: now,
+ lastUsedAt: now,
+ userId: granted.userId,
+ token: accessToken,
+ hash: accessToken,
+ name: granted.clientId,
+ permission: granted.scopes,
+ });
+
+ if (granted.revoked) {
+ this.#logger.info('Canceling the token as the authorization code was revoked in parallel during the process.');
+ await accessTokensRepository.delete({ token: accessToken });
+ return;
+ }
+
+ granted.grantedToken = accessToken;
+ this.#logger.info(`Generated access token for ${granted.clientId} for user ${granted.userId}, with scope: [${granted.scopes}]`);
+
+ return [accessToken, undefined, { scope: granted.scopes.join(' ') }];
+ })().then(args => done(null, ...args ?? []), err => done(err));
+ }));
+ }
+
+ @bindThis
+ public async createServer(fastify: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414.html
+ // https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#indieauth-server-metadata
+ fastify.get('/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', async (_request, reply) => {
+ reply.send({
+ issuer: this.config.url,
+ authorization_endpoint: new URL('/oauth/authorize', this.config.url),
+ token_endpoint: new URL('/oauth/token', this.config.url),
+ scopes_supported: kinds,
+ response_types_supported: ['code'],
+ grant_types_supported: ['authorization_code'],
+ service_documentation: 'https://misskey-hub.net',
+ code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
+ authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true,
+ });
+ });
+
+ fastify.get('/oauth/authorize', async (request, reply) => {
+ const oauth2 = (request.raw as MiddlewareRequest).oauth2;
+ if (!oauth2) {
+ throw new Error('Unexpected lack of authorization information');
+ }
+
+ this.#logger.info(`Rendering authorization page for "${oauth2.client.name}"`);
+
+ reply.header('Cache-Control', 'no-store');
+ return await reply.view('oauth', {
+ transactionId: oauth2.transactionID,
+ clientName: oauth2.client.name,
+ scope: oauth2.req.scope.join(' '),
+ });
+ });
+ fastify.post('/oauth/decision', async () => { });
+ fastify.post('/oauth/token', async () => { });
+
+ fastify.register(fastifyView, {
+ root: fileURLToPath(new URL('../web/views', import.meta.url)),
+ engine: { pug },
+ defaultContext: {
+ version: this.config.version,
+ config: this.config,
+ },
+ });
+
+ await fastify.register(fastifyExpress);
+ fastify.use('/oauth/authorize', this.#server.authorize(((areq, done) => {
+ (async (): Promise<Parameters<typeof done>> => {
+ // This should return client/redirectURI AND the error, or
+ // the handler can't send error to the redirection URI
+
+ const { codeChallenge, codeChallengeMethod, clientID, redirectURI, scope } = areq as OAuthParsedRequest;
+
+ this.#logger.info(`Validating authorization parameters, with client_id: ${clientID}, redirect_uri: ${redirectURI}, scope: ${scope}`);
+
+ const clientUrl = validateClientId(clientID);
+
+ // https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#client-information-discovery
+ // "the server may want to resolve the domain name first and avoid fetching the document
+ // if the IP address is within the loopback range defined by [RFC5735]
+ // or any other implementation-specific internal IP address."
+ if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test' || process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_CHECK_IP_RANGE === '1') {
+ const lookup = await dns.lookup(clientUrl.hostname);
+ if (ipaddr.parse(lookup.address).range() !== 'unicast') {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('client_id resolves to disallowed IP range.', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Find client information from the remote.
+ const clientInfo = await discoverClientInformation(this.#logger, this.httpRequestService, clientUrl.href);
+
+ // Require the redirect URI to be included in an explicit list, per
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#section-4.1.3
+ /* if (!clientInfo.redirectUris.includes(redirectURI)) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('Invalid redirect_uri', 'invalid_request');
+ } */
+
+ try {
+ const scopes = [...new Set(scope)].filter(s => kinds.includes(s));
+ if (!scopes.length) {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('`scope` parameter has no known scope', 'invalid_scope');
+ }
+ areq.scope = scopes;
+
+ // Require PKCE parameters.
+ // Recommended by https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#authorization-request, but also prevents downgrade attack:
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#name-pkce-downgrade-attack
+ if (typeof codeChallenge !== 'string') {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('`code_challenge` parameter is required', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+ if (codeChallengeMethod !== 'S256') {
+ throw new AuthorizationError('`code_challenge_method` parameter must be set as S256', 'invalid_request');
+ }
+ } catch (err) {
+ return [err as Error, clientInfo, redirectURI];
+ }
+
+ return [null, clientInfo, redirectURI];
+ })().then(args => done(...args), err => done(err));
+ }) as ValidateFunctionArity2));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/authorize', this.#server.errorHandler({
+ mode: 'indirect',
+ modes: getQueryMode(this.config.url),
+ }));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/authorize', this.#server.errorHandler());
+
+ fastify.use('/oauth/decision', bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/decision', this.#server.decision((req, done) => {
+ const { body } = req as OAuth2DecisionRequest;
+ this.#logger.info(`Received the decision. Cancel: ${!!body.cancel}`);
+ req.user = body.login_token;
+ done(null, undefined);
+ }));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/decision', this.#server.errorHandler());
+
+ // Clients may use JSON or urlencoded
+ fastify.use('/oauth/token', bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/token', bodyParser.json({ strict: true }));
+ fastify.use('/oauth/token', this.#server.token());
+ fastify.use('/oauth/token', this.#server.errorHandler());
+
+ // Return 404 for any unknown paths under /oauth so that clients can know
+ // whether a certain endpoint is supported or not.
+ fastify.all('/oauth/*', async (_request, reply) => {
+ reply.code(404);
+ reply.send({
+ error: {
+ message: 'Unknown OAuth endpoint.',
+ code: 'UNKNOWN_OAUTH_ENDPOINT',
+ id: 'aa49e620-26cb-4e28-aad6-8cbcb58db147',
+ kind: 'client',
+ },
+ });
+ });
+ }
+}